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Abstract
This article critically examines multinational corporation (MNC)–host government rela-
tions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) through the prism of the GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK) corruption scandal. The article takes the episode as a revelatory case study and 
analyses it with a view to uncovering further data on the imperatives that govern inter-
actions between the PRC and MNCs. Drawing upon the theoretical framework pro-
vided by David M. Anderson’s conception of leverage, the authors attempt to unite the 
two themes of cultural analysis and commercial analysis. By highlighting both the rising 
commercial risks for MNCs and considerable legal risks for Chinese and non- Chinese 
intermediaries working on their behalf, the case itself underlines a gulf between theo-
retical understanding and practical experience of engagement with China in this sphere. 
The authors argue that the GSK corruption case demonstrates both that MNC norma-
tive bargaining leverage (the use of standards and norms, considered legitimate by both 
sides, to gain advantage or protect one’s position) in the PRC is illusory and that the 
Chinese party- state possesses far greater negative bargaining leverage (leverage based 
upon the capacity to make the other side worse off) than typically assumed. 
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Introduction
In September 2014, the British pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) was 
found guilty of bribing Chinese doctors and hospitals to prescribe its medical products 
and was levied a record- high fine of  CNY 3 billion (USD 386 million). The corruption 
scandal engulfed senior managers at GSK, brought the company’s entire China strategy 
into question, and resulted in the imprisonment of two corporate investigators drafted in 
to explore an aspect of the case on GSK’s behalf. 
The authors present the GSK corruption scandal in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) as a revelatory case study which constitutes one of the best opportunities in recent 
years to explore the dynamics of the relationship between China and the West, and mul-
tinational corporations – Chinese party- state (MNC- PS) engagement in particular.
While the GSK scandal received wide coverage in the media at the time, its impor-
tance to academic understanding of international engagement has not been sufficiently 
acknowledged in the existing literature. Despite the ubiquity of news reports and pun-
ditry generated by the episode, the unique circumstances in which the scandal came to 
pass have actually generated valuable data on the typically obscured relationship between 
MNCs and the PS. Given the rising geopolitical weight attached to this relationship, 
careful analysis of the episode is essential. The authors believe that the episode holds the 
potential to contribute valuable new understanding to our knowledge of this area of 
international engagement with the PRC.
The existing academic literature on the GSK scandal is let down by overly reduction-
ist and one- sided analytical frameworks. In this sense, the analysis reflects wider faults 
in academic commentary on PRC–MNC relations. In response, the authors draw upon 
David M. Anderson’s “leverage” theoretical framework as a device that allows them to 
consider a range of disparate factors in a broadly compatible equation. In the context of 
this research article, leverage is understood as “the property of a lever and fulcrum, 
which uses minimum effort to create a maximum force” (Anderson, 2014a: 5). 
Considering the case through the prism of Anderson’s leverage theoretical framework 
not only offers, original perspective on this area of engagement with the PRC, but also 
provides an opportunity to discuss the veracity of the framework based on its adoption 
in this instance.
At the heart of the research puzzle are imperatives that govern interactions between 
MNCs and the PS. Building on this foundation, the article considers three related 
research questions. There is extensive evidence of major MNCs engaging in targeted 
hiring of family members of senior Chinese officials (Gara, 2016; Raymond and Lynch, 
2015). Initial media coverage of the GSK case also suggests the presence of familial 
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linkages. The first research question thus queries the extent to which familial links reach-
ing into the PS played a role (Chatterjee, 2015). The second question considers precisely 
why GSK’s China engagement went so spectacularly wrong in the case of the bribery 
scandal that it became engulfed in. Finally, the article seeks to ascertain the efficacy of 
Anderson’s leverage framework in the case of MNC–PS relations. As an adjunct to this 
final research question, our research seeks to test the veracity of the initial academic 
investigations into the scandal.
Following the introduction, the study considers the fundamental elements of 
Anderson’s leverage framework. The ensuing section discusses both the existing aca-
demic literature covering the GSK scandal and pertinent research into MNC–PS rela-
tions. The next section spells out the research approach employed in this article, before 
a working through of the context of the scandal. An account of the scandal itself is fol-
lowed by a conclusion that serves as a discussion of the findings and possible future 
directions of research.
Leverage as a Framework
Anderson’s edited volume Leveraging: A Political, Economic and Societal Framework 
provides the theoretical foundation in which the authors consider the GSK scandal in 
China. That framework is itself the product of a paper delivered by Anderson (2010) at 
the Brookings Institution. Each chapter of his book represents an attempt to apply the 
leverage framework to a particular case or theme, with each academic exploring phe-
nomena from their own area of expertise through the prism of leverage. Anderson 
explains that the framework he has constructed consists of three related concepts of 
leveraging, “namely traditional bargaining leverage, what many management theorists 
called resource leverage, and what many of the economists were calling financial or 
investment leverage” (Anderson, 2014a: xi). Taking Archimedes’ notion of leverage as 
the central metaphor, (Anderson, 2014a: xi) states that leverage “involves getting maxi-
mum effect from exerting a minimum effort, and you have to use some device or tool to 
create a fulcrum in which the maximum effect is created.”
Accepting that leverage in this form has existed since the dawn of our species, 
Anderson argues that it has only gained such prominence through the onset of the infor-
mation age. Summarising the factors that have given rise to leveraging as we know it, 
Anderson (2014b: 13)  states:
In an interconnected world where power is diffused and individuals can have the same or 
more power than organizations or even countries, everyone is forced to leverage resources 
to attain their goals and also to use leverage in bargaining situations in new ways, especially 
in connection with resource leverage and investment leverage. In the twenty- first century, 
leverage is king.
The notion of leverage, as it is understood here, has begun to receive wider attention. 
Most notably, Salamon (2014) employs it to analyse philanthropy and social investment 
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in his landmark monograph Leverage for Good. In the course of Anderson’s edited 
works, authors apply the framework to a number of situations in political, economic, and 
social life. As well as subjects as diverse as “the contemporary family” and “regulatory 
processes,” the work includes a chapter by Mulloy (2014), who carefully examines the 
period of reform and opening up in the PRC. Considered within the leverage framework, 
he reinterprets the country’s development as a careful balance between different types of 
leverage strategy that depended at various times on the specific weaknesses of  Western 
governmental and non- governmental actors. In this sense the PRC’s success securing 
most favoured nation (MFN) status for trade with the United States is explored as pri-
marily an act of bargaining leverage. On the other hand, knowledge transfer from 
Western companies that interacted with the PRC was primarily a feat of resource lever-
age, in this case leveraging its own cheap labour and lax environmental laws (amongst 
other factors) to attract foreign companies (Mulloy, 2014: 71).
Bargaining Leverage
Anderson asserts that in its simplest terms, bargaining leverage is the use of a tool in a 
bargaining situation to extract a concession. He explains, “frequently, one side withholds 
consent to including one feature of the proposed agreement in order to extract a conces-
sion from the other side; in so doing, the side withholding is using the withheld item as 
leverage in order to extract the concession” (Anderson, 2014b: 5). The author gives the 
example of a policy negotiation in US Congress where one side withholds its agreement 
on a modest item in order to block the passage of a law that covers a far greater number 
of topics.
Drawing on the work of G. Richard Shell, Anderson (2014b) divides up bargaining 
leverage into three further categories: negative leverage (leverage based upon the capac-
ity to make the other side worse off); positive leverage (a needs- based leverage based on 
what the other side desires); and normative leverage (the use of standards and norms, 
considered legitimate by both sides, to gain advantage or protect one’s position).
Resource Leverage
Anderson suggests that though resource leverage overlaps with bargaining leverage, it is 
not employed as part of an agreement with someone else, but rather is the careful 
employment of resources themselves to create conditions where one can exert maximum 
effect from minimum effort. Anderson argues that the internet is an excellent example, 
citing organisations that have used it to “sell products, or reach voters, or develop rela-
tionships, promote the ends of a federal agency, or build a grassroots movement to pro-
mote a social end” (Anderson, 2014b: 6). For clarity, Anderson states that the leverage 
of one’s relationships can also be considered a form of resource leverage.
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Investment Leverage
The use of the term leverage will be familiar to most within the context of finance, and 
indeed, the financial crisis has been referred to as a “leverage crisis” (Anderson, 2014b: 
7). Within the financial sector there are actually a range of tools that refer to “leverag-
ing,” but, as Anderson suggests, in terms of the wider meaning of leverage as employed 
here, all of those tools “revolve around the core idea of using funds, typically borrowed, 
as a fulcrum to achieve a large return on investment” (Anderson, 2014b: 7). At its most 
basic, investment leverage is when “money that is borrowed is invested in order to pro-
duce an outsized return on the investment” (Anderson, 2014b: 5).
Anderson explains that his framework was not constructed as “a theory of causal laws 
which have predictive power. Instead, we are using broadly causal explanations to 
explain certain phenomena in the social world” (p. 4). In this sense it lends itself to anal-
ysis of the GSK scandal for its explanatory power to explore a revelatory episode where 
assessment in the media was wide but not deep. Adding to the case for a leverage- based 
analysis, the framework as described here offers not only a means to bisect typically 
disparate elements such as the micro and macro features of the case, but also modes of 
analysis associated with cultural studies and those associated with business studies. 
Finally, just as Anderson’s theoretical framework would appear to represent a helpful 
prism through which to interpret the GSK scandal, the contested terrain of MNC–PS 
relations in which this scandal occurred is an ideal arena in which to test, and if neces-
sary develop, the theory.
Emerging Literature on the GSK Scandal and Established 
Literature on MNC–PS Relations
This review of existing literature is shaped by both the research focus on the imperatives 
that govern MNC–PS relations and the widely recognised practice of strategic hiring of 
individuals with links to governments by MNCs in emerging markets (Congressional 
Executive Commission on China, 2014; Jordan, 2017; Srere, 2015). It includes consid-
eration of the small body of research into the GSK scandal itself, as well as wider aca-
demic discourse on MNC–PS relations. In this sense this research sets out to evaluate 
and process the events of the GSK scandal using Anderson’s leverage framework to 
enrich the academic debate on the role of MNCs in the PRC. In addition, this study 
intends to inspire and to some extent inform further research into the GSK scandal. The 
salacious details of the case and their wide transmission via global media should not 
distract from their value. The scandal propelled into the public sphere valuable and typ-
ically hidden information about the relationship between MNCs and the Chinese PS at 
the elite level.
The GSK Scandal
Rather than entertain the notion that the GSK scandal reveals ethically problematic 
behaviour by all involved, the majority of existing literature on the case itself has treated 
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it as an instance where an MNC simply has not complied with local law and custom. The 
authors will demonstrate that this reading is a grave simplification and in fact, the case 
offers a glimpse of a complex landscape containing many compromised actors. GSK’s 
corporate misconduct is not in doubt and includes mis- selling drugs in the United States 
for which it received a USD 3 billion fine, as well as other cases in Poland, Romania, the 
United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq (Hirschler, 2015; Neville, 2012). 
But by offering a superficial analysis of the corporate environment in the PRC and mak-
ing recommendations that hinge on better MNC cultural understanding of the PRC, the 
literature thus far remains firmly in the theoretical realm and as a result arrives at conclu-
sions that run counter to the experiences of many practitioners. While there has been 
some excellent scholarship on the court cases that resulted from the GSK scandal, most 
prominently the research by Clarke (2015), these studies primarily are concerned with 
the legal landscape rather than the scandal itself.
A prime example of research that fails to penetrate the complexities of the case is 
Schipani et al.’s (2015) interpretation of the scandal. Their article argues that “Chinese 
culture pays close attention to the integrity and morality of people, and commercial cor-
ruption plainly conflicts with these basic tenets” (Schipani et al., 2015: 102). The same 
piece, without irony, includes references to the passing of new anti- corruption laws as 
well as the prosecution of Bo Xilai as evidence of the rule of law. Whilst the study’s 
conclusion that GSK had bribed “hospitals, doctors, officials, and professional medical 
organizations” seems reasonable, the assertion that the PRC represents a law- abiding, 
conventional “free market” does not (Schipani et al., 2015: 102). Yang and Jiang, 2015: 
The study evidences little engagement with the actual conditions on the ground in PRC 
medical institutions or the compromised nature of regulation in the PRC.
Yang and Jiang (2015) explore the scandal from the point of view of corporate crisis 
management. Again, the complex interplay of objectives is left untouched and instead 
the authors explore the role of cultural difference. They argue that “managers [should] 
pay close attention to the context in which a crisis unfolds and act accordingly in a 
Chinese way” as well as focusing on “sentiment reason and law” as they are “rooted in 
age- old Chinese philosophy” (Yang and Jiang, 2015: 200). Whilst the piece accepts that 
interpretation of the law in the PRC is uneven, the recommendation that foreign MNCs 
should simply nurture strong governmental ties not only lacks depth but also overlooks 
that in times of crisis such ties can also endanger the MNC.
Chow (2015) presents a much more convincing study that considers the GSK case in 
the context of a broader campaign against corruption. Exploring the scandal in a slightly 
different way than the other research discussed here, Chow draws upon the GSK exam-
ple as one of many, demonstrating that the anti- corruption campaign has led to less 
transparency as important cases are settled behind the scenes. He concludes that “in the 
GSK case […] the decision to investigate and prosecute was one made at the highest 
levels of the Communist Party not by the local level  Public Security Bureau (PSB) and 
Procuratorate” (Chow, 2015: 698–699). Chow’s discussion of the difference between the 
law and its implementation on the ground is a welcome addition to the literature, as well 
as a finding of note for the MNCs that continue to operate in the PRC.
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MNC–PS Interaction
Literature that explores the MNC–PS relationship more broadly is typically divided 
between research from a cultural perspective and research from a business- legal compli-
ance perspective. This results in a predominance of studies examining the role of guanxi 
in Chinese culture and society and those examining how MNCs can operate in the PRC 
whilst upholding corporate compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA). 
The GSK scandal and its spillover into the public arena presents an opportunity to pro-
vide insight into the risks posed to foreign MNCs and their representatives, not in the 
form of FCPA compliance on the Western side but rather risks incurred from entangle-
ment in patron–client networks that permeate the PS.
The scholarship of Yang (2000, 2006) and Osburg (2013a) has produced deep insights 
into the cultural imperatives that informed the type of relations evidenced in the case of 
the GSK scandal. Such research provides important context to the case as explored here. 
Yang convincingly argues that Chinese intermediaries acting on behalf of MNCs are 
likely to be subordinates in a Chinese political faction. When the family backgrounds of 
the intermediary are the key reason for their employment by the MNC, such intermedi-
aries qualify as members of “a clique of private and close confidants, called qinxin” 
(Yang, 2000: 96). According to Yang, such qinxin (亲信) are physically close to political 
leaders, able to follow orders without questioning, and exhibit absolute loyalty to them. 
Yang explains that qinxin are expected “(1) to do what the leaders cannot do […]; (2) to 
take care of or to fight for their personal and private interests […]; and (3) to serve as the 
scapegoat in times of trouble” (Yang, 2000: 97).
The relationship between qinxin and political leaders can furthermore be explained in 
terms of the dynamics of patron–client relationships, which exhibit special characteris-
tics. Political patrons in mainland China generally exert influence by granting favours 
(en, 恩), which make the client indebted to the patron (enqing, 恩情). While this creates 
a strong bond between the patron and client, it also leaves the client in a very dependent 
position vis-à-vis the patron, who is extending his or her influence. The possibility of 
losing patronage means that the client may not be able to develop any kind of meaning-
ful independence, thereby leading to conforming behaviour (Yang, 2000: 97).
Osburg (2013a: 80) has pointed out that
deals and alliances between government officials and businessmen [...] should not be read 
as mechanistic manifestations of a stable, traditional moral economy, but rather as strategic, 
fragile, ad hoc structures that invoke and draw on a closed, moral frame of distribution as a 
means of gaining an advantage in China’s economy and that are constantly under threat by 
other modes of power, distributional logics and personal loyalties.
The fragility of personal relationships is an important caveat to Anderson’s concept 
of resource leverage. While personal ties to the PS can be an important lever for MNCs, 
these relationships come with hidden liabilities.
Osburg (2013b) explains that
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[the] new rich businessmen I studied operated in tightly- bound social networks governed by 
an ethos of mutual aid and brotherhood. This ethos benefits the well- connected members of 
these networks, who have insider access to deals, capital, and opportunities. From the per-
spective of those on the outside of elite networks, however, these relationships are the basis 
of corruption […] (The) moral economy of elite guanxi networks results in very immoral 
consequences for the public good.
Further notable studies into the cultural dynamics exhibited in the GSK case take a 
more forgiving line. Hooker (2009: 8) argues that the type of nepotism and cronyism 
associated with emerging markets like the PRC’s might actually be considered “highly 
functional in a Confucian setting.” Likewise, he argues that practices considered routine 
in the  West may be considered corrupting elsewhere. His analysis applied to the GSK 
scandal would suggest a failure of cultural adjustment by the MNC. The authors’ analy-
sis of the GSK case will suggest that, in that instance at least, Hooker’s argument affords 
too little agency to the actors involved or the political dimension of the scandal. Earle 
and Cava (2017) bridge the two prominent strands of analysis, offering a study that com-
bines appreciation of the cultural factors involved in MNC–PS dynamics whilst consid-
ering the impact on FCPA compliance. Whilst this combined approach is welcome, they 
conclude that “business must be able to engage in legitimate relationship building and 
other promotional activities if we wish to encourage its growth,” appealing to US author-
ities, “surely, the FCPA can permit a middle ground” (Earle and Cava, 2017: 146). 
Conspicuous in its absence is the analysis of the risks and hidden liabilities for the MNC 
on the PRC side of this equation.
Like the majority of business studies- focused research touching on MNCs’ targeted 
hiring of PRC officials’ family members, Chatterjee’s (2015) article is concerned with 
the legal consequences in terms of the FCPA. Despite discussing J. P. Morgan’s “Sons 
and Daughters Program” of targeted hiring of senior officials’ children in the PRC, 
Chatterjee concludes that FCPA enforcement “exceeds the intended scope and purpose 
of the legislation […] [and] will likely impair business relations overseas, allow prose-
cutors to control the manner and disposition of all FCPA resolutions, and yield undesir-
able foreign policy consequences” (Chatterjee, 2015: 1804). Chatterjee’s key contribution 
to the academic discourse is her warning against a “criminalization” of the MNC prac-
tice of relationship hiring. Such a narrow and legalistic interpretation of MNC engage-
ment in emerging markets, however, runs the danger of giving corporate actors a carte 
blanche in their dealings with host governments.
Leung and Barnes (2020)’ study is perhaps the most prominent contribution of recent 
years to the growing body of literature on MNC–PS relations. In it, they argue that schol-
ars are drawn to different conclusions on PRC business practices depending on whether 
they employ an emic or etic approach. In this case, emic refers to an approach from the 
“local” point of view whilst the etic approach is that of the “outside,” typically the 
scholar looking in. Drawing upon an emic approach, they suppose, like Hooker, that 
what exists in the PRC might be considered an “ethical cronyism.” From this standpoint 
the study goes on to offer advice to MNCs “as they grapple with acquiring insider status 
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in order to succeed in China” (Leung and Barnes, 2020: 16). In this sense, the article’s 
conclusion matches with Yang and Jiang’s examination of the GSK scandal itself. Like 
the majority of literature that touches on the GSK scandal and wider MNC–PS relations, 
there is little consideration of the risks associated with entanglement in patron–client 
networks that the GSK case laid bare, an etic perspective which also needs to be taken 
into account. By employing Anderson’s leverage framework this research article over-
comes the limitations of existing scholarship. Honing in on the intended and unintended 
consequences of targeted hiring in the PRC, the authors reveal dynamics of the MNC–
PS relationship from both an emic and etic perspective.
Research Approach
This study employs a case study approach to explain the GSK corruption scandal. The 
focus on a single case study is justified as it represents a rare occasion where private 
machinations of Chinese political elites, foreign investors, and their respective interme-
diaries become visible and produce both tangible and traceable consequences. In his 
chapter, “The Single MNC as a Research Site,” Lervik (2011: 231) suggests that sin-
gle- N case studies involving MNCs are especially justified where “the virtue of the case 
is not its representativeness, but rather its uniqueness.” The GSK scandal fulfils this 
criterion, representing a rare example of MNC–PS breakdown in relations played out in 
a semi- public arena. Thus, the scandal and accompanying court cases represent a closely 
viewed “critical incident” (Edvardsson, 1992: 17) by which to examine a crucially 
understudied segment of Sino- international interaction that resides firmly within the 
PRC’s domestic arena. The nature of the GSK scandal itself meets Schell’s (1992) con-
ditions for suitability of a case study approach as (1) the scandal is a contemporary 
phenomenon (ruling out a primarily historical study) within its real- life context where 
the boundaries between context and phenomenon are not clear, and (2) there is little 
investigator control (ruling out controlled experiment) over the phenomenon that may be 
queried by way of “how and why research questions.” According to Yin’s (1994: 41) 
classification, the research is best categorised as a “revelatory case study,” justified by its 
exploration of “a situation previously inaccessible to scientific investigation” that is only 
“obscurely understood”, generating material that has the potential to stimulate “much 
further research, and eventually the development of policy actions.”
The authors construct a “thick description” of events, drawing upon a wide range of 
sources to provide as clear an account of the scandal as possible through triangulation. 
This bricolage of sources includes both domestic and international journalistic 
accounts of the scandal, legal commentary around the resulting court cases, and a 
degree of network analysis to better illustrate the relationships between the central 
actors of the saga. The process of multiple source verification lends itself to the 
research puzzle, allowing the authors to layer several sources when exploring the 
familial linkages and the fault lines of the scandal. The authors also take the opportu-
nity to explore the applicability of the leverage theoretical framework, noting that 
Lervik (2011: 235) suggests at single- N MNC case studies “provide a fertile context 
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[…] for deductive theory testing.” The following section sets out the context in which 
the GSK scandal took place. This wider context is important as it provides further data 
by which to ascertain precisely what type of leverage is being employed in this equa-
tion and by whom.
Context of the Case
The Allure of Mainland China as an Emerging Market
Since the earliest interaction between China and the West, merchants have regarded 
the Asian giant as a market of immense potential (Studwell, 2003). To some extent, 
mainland China’s opening up and middle- class growth are seen as the realisation of 
such potential. For many of today’s largest companies, the Chinese market retains its 
enormous appeal due to the progress made and the capacity for future growth. Gordon 
(2016) suggests that for CEOs of large MNCs in particular, the Chinese market rep-
resents a useful tool as well as an opportunity. Amidst slow growth rates in developed 
nations, company leaders can cite China as an opportunity that will demand long- 
term investor patience but has widely acknowledged potential to ultimately deliver 
growth.
This observation is especially true for the pharmaceutical sector, where China’s age-
ing population represents an industry- specific growth opportunity. Grimes and Miozzo 
(2015) cite evidence demonstrating that the rapid growth in numbers of citizens earning 
between USD 7,000 and USD 27,000 is accompanied by a diagnosis revolution whereby 
recorded instances of previously undiagnosed or misdiagnosed conditions (such as can-
cer and hypertension) are on the rise. This potential growth strategy model is reinforced 
by industry- wide data that show, despite very substantial investment by the world’s larg-
est pharmaceutical companies, that the Chinese market at this stage generates only 1–3 
per cent of global revenue (Grimes and Miozzo, 2015: 1881). Substantial research and 
development (R&D) investment in China by virtually all major pharmaceutical compa-
nies also indicates a long- term approach, this coming despite an ineffective regulatory 
framework and opposition to public–private partnerships that constitute significant 
obstacles to R&D (Li et al., 2008). Evidently, both pharmaceutical groups and the PRC 
government possess various types of bargaining leverage when engaging, but this back-
ground reveals the strong positive bargaining leverage held by the Chinese side as gate-
keeper to a market with immense growth potential.
GSK conforms to the industry- wide focus on China as a key growth market. GSK had 
invested USD 6.09 billion by 2012 whilst generating only 1.6 per cent of global sales in 
the country according to figures from 2013 (Grimes and Miozzo, 2015). Head of GSK 
Consumer Healthcare Business for Asia Pacific, Middle East, and Africa, Zubair Ahmed, 
declared in 2016 that “the sheer importance of China to our business is humongous,” 
going on to explain that “China is the single biggest market in the Asia, Middle East & 
Africa (AMA) region in terms of size, and is certainly the one with the biggest growth 
potential” (Ding, 2016).
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China’s Pharmaceutical Sector Within the Context of an Underfunded and 
Under-Regulated Healthcare System
The exponential growth of the PRC’s pharmaceutical sector has been facilitated by a 
combination of foreign direct investment by MNCs and domestic entrepreneurialism. 
The Chinese Communist Party facilitated such economic growth with the help of five- 
year plans (Shambaugh, 2000). More recent policy initiatives such as “Made in China 
2025” aim at industrial upgrading and call for the development of biopharmaceuticals 
(Kennedy, 2015). While China’s pharmaceutical sector is typically viewed through the 
prism of its future growth potential (Li, 2016), one must also consider how it operates 
within the context of an underfunded and under- regulated Chinese healthcare system, 
which is beset by corruption and collusion.
According to Rose- Ackerman and Tan’s (2014) discussion of the Chinese healthcare 
system, “corruption appears to be endemic in the procurement of drugs” and, according 
to former employees of Siemens, “nearly all major multinational healthcare companies 
bribe in one way or another.” The piece goes on: “you cannot even sustain your business 
if you don’t bribe.” The prevalence of corrupt practices can in part be explained by the 
lack of PS funding for the provision of health services in China. Rose- Ackerman and Tan 
(2014: 7) argue that in the case of China’s healthcare system
neither public nor private insurance provides broad coverage. Insurance costs are low, but 
much spending is out- of- pocket by patients at the time of service. Second, national reforms 
have pushed financing responsibilities onto local and provincial healthcare institutions and 
place heavy pressure on them to maintain service levels and budgets. 
According to the World Bank, China’s overall expenditure for healthcare has only 
moderately risen from 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2014, which 
is a higher percentage than Botswana (5.4 per cent) but below Azerbaijan (6 per cent; 
World Health Organization Data, 2017).
Low levels of funding have encouraged rent- seeking activities in China’s healthcare 
system. Rent- seeking refers to all largely unproductive, expropriate activities, which 
bring positive return to the individual but not to society (Krueger, 1974). According to 
Prybyla (2000), “China since 1978 has removed most of the spoiled remains of the cen-
tral planning system, and has marketed the greater part of the economy’s allocative and 
co- ordinating mechanism.” The emerging markets, however, “are quite imperfect, as 
they are linked by networks of interpersonal connections” (Prybyla, 2000: 213).  Chinese 
scholar, He Qinglian (cited in Osburg, 2013b: 78–79) has pointed out that…”  
[…] what has emerged in China is a system for distributing resources that is rooted in nei-
ther a purely planned nor a market- based economy. Instead, rent- seeking activities that lead 
to acquisition of capital and other forms of wealth rely on a highly elaborate and informal 
network or web of social connections [...] Informal networks of social relationships are, in 
short, a major resource, in that they are the key mechanism for mobilizing and directing the 
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flow of wealth, making them not just of great economic significance, but also critical to the 
way in which China goes about handling its raw materials and other such social resources.
Linking to the case that this study considers, rent- seeking activities in the health sec-
tor are particularly visible in the relationship between pharmaceutical companies, hospi-
tals, and doctors. Low levels of PS funding mean that in order to endure, Chinese hospital 
managers need to increase revenue through the sale of prescribed medication. For this to 
happen, Chinese doctors need to comply with the hospitals’ commercial strategy. Since 
Chinese doctors are generally underpaid (The Economist, 2013), they are easy targets of 
pharmaceutical companies bribing them to prescribe their branded medication. It is in 
this context that the GSK scandal took place. Against this backdrop, the director of the 
Center on China’s Transnational Relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology, David Zweig commented on the GSK scandal by stating that “Everyone 
else pays bribes. Glaxo just got caught” (cited in Bradsher and Buckley, 2014).
The Scandal
From late 2012, thirteen senior executives at GSK received a series of emails from an 
account listed simply as “gskwhistleblower,” each alleging endemic corrupt practices 
throughout the Chinese arm of the British pharmaceutical giant (Kaiman and Kollewe, 
2014). This proved to be the beginning of a scandal that reshaped the landscape for for-
eign firms operating in the country. As well as senior GSK officials, China’s healthcare 
regulator began receiving emails alleging that GSK’s staff were bribing healthcare pro-
fessionals (Sawer et al., 2014). In the first two months of 2013, the emails sent to senior 
GSK executives included highly detailed accusations that suggested insider knowledge 
of the company’s practices in China (Kaiman and Kollewe, 2014). Targeting the compa-
ny’s most senior member of staff in China, Mark Reilly, one email alleged “the firm’s 
sales staff – with the connivance of Mr Reilly – paid doctors and key staff in hospital 
purchasing departments to sell its products and then attempted to hide the payments” 
(Sawer et al., 2014). Next, the executives received an email from the same address with 
a link to an online video. The online video was a sex tape of Mark Reilly with his 
Chinese girlfriend, apparently filmed secretly at his secure Shanghai apartment (Moore, 
2014a).
Vivian Shi had assumed the position of “Head of Government Affairs” for the Chinese 
office of the British pharmaceutical giant and was hired for her “impeccable connections 
inside the Communist Party” (Moore, 2014b; Ward, 2015). Shi’s father had been a senior 
cadre in Shanghai’s health bureau and is believed to have been a mentor to Meng Jianzhu, 
the then Politburo member responsible for China’s police force and legal system (Mitchel 
and Ward, 2014; Moore, 2014b). Later, reports in 2014 would indicate that Meng took a 
personal interest in the GSK scandal (Sheridan, 2014).
The targeted hiring of children of senior officials displayed here correlates broadly 
with the account of the practice provided above. Whilst the act of hiring these individu-
als is in effect an investment (one pays a salary to that individual with the hope that it will 
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lead to a greater return through the benefits the linkage affords), the individual becomes 
a resource leverage for the MNC in question. By this, we mean their employment at the 
MNC supposedly generates “conditions where one can exert maximum effect from min-
imum effort.” In this case that maxim translates to buy- in to a network that intersects 
with the higher echelons of government via family linkages.
Whilst the targeted hiring of the family of officials by MNCs is common beyond the 
borders of the PRC, it has a number of idiosyncratic qualities in the case of China. Chen 
(2015) has argued that the combination of the one- child policy and a lingering “job 
inheritance policy” at SOEs beyond its official abolition in the late 1980s has led to 
strong parent–child ties within the labour market. This phenomenon comes amid wide-
spread frustration with the perceived advantages bestowed upon the children of officials, 
the group being dubbed “second- generation officials” (guanerdai, 官二代) in traditional 
and new media (Lin and de Jong, 2017). The phenomenon of hiring the children of offi-
cials, such as Shi, for their family connections is taken to its logical conclusion in the 
hiring of “princelings,” the children of existing and former high- ranking government 
officials. In 2013 it was revealed that J. P. Morgan had been running a “Sons and 
Daughters Program” in China, a strategy to hire the adult children of senior government 
officials (Earle and Cava, 2017). The investigation into J. P. Morgan’s hiring practice 
was soon expanded to include five other international banks as evidence grew of coordi-
nated targeting of the so- called princelings (Son, 2013). Within that context, GSK’s own 
strategy, though morally objectionable, is not an outlier amongst other PRC- active 
MNCs.
GSK’s own internal investigation into the identity of the whistle- blower notes that 
Shi had been dismissed in December 2012 for allegedly falsifying her travel expenses 
(Moore, 2014c). In fact, internal documents suggest that she was fired because she was 
suspected of being behind the whistle- blower emails alleging corrupt business practices 
(Barboza, 2016). Regardless of her precise role in the whistle- blower emails, or whether 
she acted alone, she was ultimately removed from her position. This is an important 
detail as the objective of this study is not to prove beyond doubt the whistle- blower’s 
identity, but to extract as much information about the motivation, costs, and benefits of 
MNC engagement in these networks in the PRC as revealed by the GSK case. Evidently 
the MNC decided to remove her on their own terms despite knowing of her connections. 
Regardless of her precise role in terms of the whistle- blower emails, GSK appears to 
have acted without extensive consideration of the ramifications. This decision was a 
massive miscalculation in terms of the leverage equation GSK was operating. In pursu-
ing the case, the MNC totally misread the normative bargaining leverage they possessed. 
Believing that both sides were operating by mutually recognised “standards and norms” 
suggests a deficit in knowledge about local conditions amongst GSK decision makers.
After concluding that Vivian Shi was almost certainly responsible for the incriminat-
ing emails, Reilly sought out corporate investigators to probe her background. Ostensibly 
this move would generate negative bargaining power, that is, provide the MNC with 
ability to make Shi worse off in some form. After six weeks of working on the case, Peter 
Humphrey delivered a thirty- nine- page report to GSK concluding that she was probably 
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the whistle- blower, noting that she had a “track record of staging similar attacks” 
(Barboza, 2016). It would later become apparent that there may have been more than one 
whistle- blower, and some reports even cast doubt over the whistle- blower’s identity 
(Barboza, 2016). Still, GSK, after hiring Shi for her connections, took the decision to 
remove her. As relations turned increasingly sour, GSK’s position came under greater 
pressure. On 28 June 2013, police in Changsha announced that four GSK employees 
were under investigation for “economic crimes” just as the whistle- blower emails had 
accused (Mitchel and Ward, 2014). Mark Reilly promptly left the country and by early 
July the Chinese Ministry of Public Security had announced that it was conducting 
investigations into the behaviour of GSK (Fox, 2015). On 16 August, the corporate 
investigators that Reilly hired, Humphrey and his partner Yu Yingzeng, were also 
arrested at their home and would be held for a full year without charge before being 
formally accused of “illegally obtaining private information” (Clarke, 2014).
In September, Mark Reilly returned to China and though he was barred from leaving 
the country, his movement domestically was not restricted. By May 2014, Chinese 
authorities had announced the discovery of an elaborate network of bribery, reportedly 
managed by Reilly who was to face trial at Changsha Intermediate People’s Court with 
four other Chinese GSK executives in September 2014 (Fox, 2015). On 19 September 
2014, Reilly and his fellow executives were handed sentences ranging between two and 
three years, but crucially, all sentences were suspended (Neate and Fletcher, 2014). Mark 
Reilly was free to leave China and did so almost immediately. GSK was found guilty of 
“bribing hospitals and doctors, [and] channelling illicit kickbacks through travel agen-
cies and pharmaceutical industry associations” (Bradsher and Buckley, 2014). On the 
same day, GSK released an apology to the Chinese people on its PRC website and also 
a statement on its global website that declared “reaching a conclusion in the investiga-
tion of our Chinese business is important, but this has been a deeply disappointing matter 
for GSK.” It went on to confirm that the company had been fined CNY 3 billion but 
reiterated its commitment to the healthcare sector in China (GlaxoSmithKline, 2014).
Chinese pharmaceutical expert Bing Shaowen stated that GSK had almost certainly 
made some form of deal with authorities and in fact the GSK statement outlined various 
commitments to the PRC (Ward et al., 2014). The MNC explained that it would win back 
trust “by continuing to invest in China and supporting China’s scientific development; 
and by further development of innovative new medicines and vaccines for diseases prev-
alent in China […] greater expansion of production and through price flexibility” (Jerin, 
2014). The new strategy on “price flexibility” correlated neatly with PS priorities, both 
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang having previously stated that reducing the prices of pharma-
ceuticals was a “core issue” (Liu, 2013). One year after the scandal, GSK CEO Sir 
Andrew Witty gave an interview to Caixin magazine that further emphasised this shift. 
He explained to Chinese readers that the company would be embarking on a brand new 
business model of selling drugs at much lower prices in China (Ren and Liu, 2015).
The legal conclusion of Peter Humphrey and Yu Yingzeng’s ordeal presents further 
evidence into the fallout when MNC–PS relations break down. In this case, the two 
individuals involved were somewhat drawn into the case unwittingly having taken on 
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the assignment offered by GSK. Regardless, the consequences of involvement were 
severe. This aspect of the case reinforces the impression that the judiciary is comman-
deered by government when required and demonstrates the type of damage that can be 
inflicted by the PS in extremis. Such a state of affairs should be central to any equation 
of leverage that involves the PRC. On 8 August 2014, Humphrey and Yu faced trial at 
the Shanghai First Intermediate People’s Court, accused of illegally acquiring personal 
information of citizens (Moore, 2014d). According to the trial transcript, the couple 
argued they were not aware that obtaining information such as household registrations 
was illegal. Yu’s lawyer reminded the court that Chinese law states that companies 
(rather than private individuals) must traffic over 600 pieces of personal information to 
be charged with a crime (Moore, 2014d). Humphrey told the court that no pieces of per-
sonal information had been sold by the company, prompting the prosecutor to ask 
Humphrey why his answers had diverged from a written “confession” (Moore, 2014d). 
Humphrey maintains that he was forced to sign certain statements and minutes under 
duress; he points out, however, that he made no confession, written or otherwise (Reuters, 
2015). The one- day trial concluded and the pair were found guilty. In addition to mone-
tary fines, Humphrey and Yu were handed sentences of two years six months and two 
years in prison, respectively (Clarke, 2015).
China legal experts were critical of the case, and Hille (2014) argued in the Financial 
Times that even after the trial had taken place, it was unclear whether or not any law had 
been broken. Leading US expert on Chinese law, Clarke (2015: 6) went further, referring 
to the precise wording of the law:
It is of course possible that Humphrey and Yu acquired some personal information through 
illegal means, but neither the transcript nor the judgment show any effort by the prosecution 
or the court respectively to show that it was in the category of information “acquired during 
the organ’s or entity’s performance of duties or provision of services.”
Clarke (2015: 20) also demonstrates that the sentences handed out to Humphrey and 
Yu were “extreme outliers and do not reflect the usual judicial practice in Shanghai.” He 
points out that Humphrey received the most severe sentence for the crime handed out by 
the court in Shanghai at that point, despite the fact that in some other cases of the same 
crime, the conditions were considered to have amounted to “serious circumstances” and 
of those cases, many defendants had been found guilty of obtaining thousands (and in 
some cases millions) of pieces of personal information (Clarke, 2015).
The legal outcomes of the cases tied to the GSK scandal present further data for con-
sideration. The high likelihood of a hidden deal between authorities and GSK, the ulti-
mately favourable outcome for GSK executives, and the demonstrably harsh treatment 
of Humphrey and Yu should focus the minds of those engaging with the PS from MNC 
or MNC intermediary perspective. The experience of the GSK case would suggest that 
the normative bargaining leverage employed by those engaging with the PRC might not 
hold under extreme conditions. It also serves as a reminder of the negative bargaining 
leverage the PS holds over groups operating within the PRC.
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Conclusion
By examining GSK’s bribery scandal in the PRC through the prism of Anderson’s lever-
age framework, this study has attempted to shed further light on the partially concealed 
world of MNC–PS interaction. As far as one can ascertain from a case that contains 
several black box elements, GSK’s mishandling of its employee Vivian Shi played a 
significant role in the scandal that endangered its presence in the PRC. Acknowledging 
the dark corners that cannot be reached, the answer to the first research question clearly 
shows that familial links between MNC and PS appear to have been a live element of the 
GSK scandal. These parent–child ties within the labour market must be viewed in the 
wider context of factionalism that permeates elite politics and, by extension, business in 
the PRC. Given the leverage that such ties afford, it is unsurprising that companies delib-
erately target children of officials. But by investing in an informal network that rep-
resents resource leverage beyond official channels, companies are also subscribing to a 
new and opaque set of rules. If the companies then fall foul of the new rules of the game 
of which they are a part, they may be at the mercy of such networks in a legal sense. The 
GSK case appears to demonstrate that the consequences of such a relationship break-
down can be catastrophic.
Our second research question asks precisely how GSK’s engagement with the PS 
failed in such a spectacular fashion. Indeed, the very reason that this scandal is a case 
study is because despite tensions, few breakdowns between PRC and MNC result in the 
release of so much material into the public arena for investigators to examine. 
Contributing to Anderson’s book on leveraging, Dees (2014: 90) states that we overlev-
erage “when the load is too heavy for the tool, so heavy that it causes—or threatens to 
cause—the mechanism to break.” This description neatly sums up GSK’s experience, 
and the language of leverage helps us to form a viable proposal of the dynamics that 
fostered the scenario. GSK undoubtedly possesses some positive bargaining leverage in 
this equation, most notably the expertise that PS leaders hope to acquire. The PRC holds 
a very significant amount of positive bargaining leverage in the form of access to a mar-
ket with vast capacity for growth. Where GSK appears to display naivety is in its han-
dling of Shi. Regardless of her role in the whistle- blower emails, she was hired for her 
connections, and so dismissing her the way they did, in a country with few “checks and 
balances” against abuse of power, was a major risk. In a rule by law country (rather than 
rule of law), GSK’s normative bargaining leverage is to some extent illusory. When pit-
ted against a familial network that reaches into the heart of the PS, the MNC simply 
cannot win. Furthermore, the PS’s resource leverage and negative bargaining leverage 
(i.e. penalties they can inflict on GSK) are vast. The scenario in which GSK found itself 
points towards a serious deficit of local knowledge; however, given how little is known 
of the negotiations that took place inside the company at the time of the scandal, this 
assessment is speculative.
This answer to the second research question reveals a central lesson for other MNCs 
working in the PRC. Commercial organisations that commit the time and capital to build 
a presence in the PRC typically consider the risks associated with presence in that mar-
ket. The contribution that this study makes in that sense is to raise the prospect that some 
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of those risks, such as the one explored in this article, represent hazards that are far out-
side the conventional  Western MNC human resource rationale. When Chinese interme-
diaries help MNCs establish key relationships with Chinese officials in municipal and 
provincial government agencies they become active players in informal networks. Such 
informal networks are shaped by group norms that are beyond the control of a human 
resource regime of an MNC such as GSK. The MNCs must realise that they are not 
simply buying into a network by way of tactical hiring, but they are also incurring liabil-
ity should that network turn against them. Whilst a number of MNCs have evidently 
benefitted from buy- in to the networks, they are by extension subject to the fallout when 
network conditions change for the worse. In arenas where such networks operate beyond 
the scope of legality, the potential for harm is significant.
The final research question considers the efficacy of Anderson’s leverage framework 
to MNC–PS interactions. The authors believe that in the case of the GSK scandal, 
Anderson’s three kinds of leverage help to shed light on the dynamics of the MNC–PS 
relationship. As discussed above, the majority of emerging literature considering the 
scandal does so from either a cultural, corporate, or legal standpoint. Given the vexed 
nature of the landscape investigated, such mono- disciplinary analysis is overly reductive 
and can lead to erroneous conclusions. Yang and Jiang’s (2015) article is a typical exam-
ple in this sense, opting for a reading of Chinese culture that results in the recommenda-
tion that  Western MNCs must simply nurture stronger government ties. Such a 
recommendation disregards both central political elements of the equation and, by 
extension, the harmful aspects of the familial ties that have become such a significant 
feature of large Western MNCs operating in the PRC. By offering a durable framework 
that can accommodate fairly disparate factors under the umbrella of leverage, Anderson’s 
outline, though still requiring further testing, proves a much more useful heuristic tool 
for analysis.
The authors believe that the framework would benefit from a more developed han-
dling of the different modes of leverage. Whilst Anderson (2014b) toys with the idea of 
“physical, cognitive and emotional” leverage, this element of the theoretical framework 
remains unconvincing. Such a limitation could conceivably have knock- on effects on the 
classification of leverage (e.g. Is a diplomat engaging in transnational negotiations mak-
ing an emotional appeal or marshalling resource leverage?). In terms of MNC–PS rela-
tions, further investigative research should be welcomed. Though there are few examples 
of MNC–PS breakdowns comparable to the GSK scandal, there are some cases that 
deserve further study. The Rio Tinto bribery scandal that resulted in the imprisonment of 
four company executives in Shanghai would be a good place to begin (Branigan, 2010). 
The authors are convinced that additional case studies of this nature employing the lever-
age framework will not only enhance our knowledge of MNC–PS interaction but will, in 
a cumulative fashion, also contribute to further refinements to the theory and practice of 
leverage.
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